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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This an appeal from the final order of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Michael R.
Murphy,

granting

respondent's

motion

to

dismiss

appeal and affirming the final determination
Director of the Department of Health.

petitioner's

of the Executive

This Court has jurisdic-

tion pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a), since this is an
appeal from a district court review of an adjudicative proceeding
before a state agency.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Is

interest

awardable

under

Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 15-1-1 where the principal sum due by contract is resolved by
the parties without entry of a formal judgment?
2.

Is petitioner entitled to interest under the Utah

Prompt Payment Act (Utah Code Ann. §§ 15-6-1, et seq.), under the
facts of this case?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At the times relevant to this appeal, VALI CONVALESCENT
Sc CARE INSTITUTIONS ("VALI") was the owner and operator of nursing homes that provided nursing home services to Medicaid recipients within the State of Utah.

Respondent Utah Department of

Health, Division of Health Care Financing ("DOH") is a department
of Utah state government and is charged with the duty of making

-1-

determinations of payments to be made to Medicaid providers for
nursing home services provided to Medicaid recipients.
In January
Cost

Profiles

of

19 80,

("FCP's")

to

VALI
DOH

submitted

for

certain

reimbursement

expended in providing care to Medicaid recipients.

Facility
of

funds

Subsequent to

the filing of these FCP's, and at the request of DOH, the Bureau
of

Medicaid

Fraud

undertook

a criminal

investigation

based upon alleged fraud committed in the FCP's.

of

VALI

Partial payment

for services rendered was made to VALI during the pendency of
that investigation.
Fraud

terminated

In April of

its

1982, the Bureau of Medicaid

investigation

of

VALI

with

no

criminal

charges being filed or any sanctions being imposed.
Pursuant

to

the

provisions

of

DOH's

administrative

hearing procedures for Medicaid recipients and providers, an exit
conference and informal hearings were held in 1984, which were
intended to make determinations of what funds were due to VALI on
the basis of the FCP's.

VALI did not raise the issue of its

entitlement to interest on the funds due during these conferences
and formal hearings, as it intended to raise that issue at a formal hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.

As a result of

the informal hearings and conferences, a determination was made
that VALI was entitled to the principal sum of $272,362.03.

It

was agreed between VALI and DOH that this amount covered only the
items that were raised at the conferences and informal hearings.
It was further specifically agreed between VALI and DOH that the
-2-

issue of interest had neither been raised nor discussed at the
conferences and informal hearings.
A formal hearing was held on July 23, 1985 before David
L. Stott, Administrative Law Judge.

The sole issue for determi-

nation was whether VALI had settled or compromised its claim for
interest.
finding

Following this hearing, the ALJ issued his decision,
that

VALI

was

entitled

to

interest,

and

stating:

"Respondent should pay the claimant interest and ought to do so
.-/ithout further delays."
On or about April 18, 1986, the Executive Director of
the Department of Health issued a decision that adopted the ALJ's
factual

findings but set aside his

legal conclusions, denying

that VALI was entitled to interest on its claim.

On or about May

13, 1986, VALI filed a petition in the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, appealing the decision of the Executive Director.

On or about July 29, 1986, respondent

filed a

motion seeking to affirm the final determination of the Executive
Director

and

to

dismiss

VALI's

petition.

Following

numerous

briefings and one hearing before the court on December 4, 1987,
Judge Murphy

issued

a Memorandum Decision, dated February 11,

1988, in which he resolved the majority of the issues existing
between the parties.
With respect to VALI f s

claims, the court

found

that

VALI was not entitled to interest on the principal contractual
obligation under either the Utah Procurement Code (Utah Code Ann.
-3-

§§ 63-56-1, et seq,), or the Utah Prompt Payment Act (Utah Code
Ann. §§ 15-6-1, et. seq. ) .

With respect to respondent's defenses,

the court found that the federal nature of the Medicaid program
did not absolve DOH's responsibilities imposed by Utah law, that
the inapplicability of the procurement code did not preempt the
applicability

of general principles

of

"pre-judgment

under Utah law, and that VALI

was not precluded

interest by either accord

satisfaction

and

interest"

from

seeking

or waiver.

Judge

:iurphy specified in his Memorandum Decision that a single issue
remained, which was framed in that decision as "whether the principle of pre-judgment interest is applicable when there has been
a resolution which avoids formal litigation."
Both parties provided additional briefs to the court on
that issue, and the court rendered its decision by Minute Entry
on May

11, 1988, granting

affirming

the

respondent's

determination

Department of Health.

of

Final

the

Executive

to

Dismiss

Director

judgment was entered

1988, and VALI filed a Notice of Appeal
July 6, 1988.

Motion

of

on June

and
the
7,

from that decision on

Respondent filed its own Notice of Appeal on July

22, 1988.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

At

all

relevant

times, VALI

owned

and

operated

nursing homes which provided services to State Medicaid recipients for the period January 1, 1978 through June 30, 1979.

-4-

In

1978, VALI entered into an agreement with the Utah State Department of Social Services for each of four VALI centers to provide
nursing home care to State recipients.

Section A-2 of the con-

tract provides that the State will:
Process payments to the provider within a
reasonable time, after receipt of an itemized
form 271-A for services rendered the previous
month.
Payment shall be made in accordance
with the allowable costs reimbursement manual
for nursing facilitiesf and shall not exceed
amounts paid by the general public for such
services. All payments subject to reasonable
cost audit and adjustment. (Emphasis added).
As can be seen, the contract does not set forth specific services
or specific prices.

Instead, it was agreed that the provider

would submit itemized statements, with fees for services, based
on the allowable cost reimbursement manual and
State audit process.

subject to the

Utah State Dept. of Social Services Nursing

Facility Provider Agreement.
2.
Profiles

In January,

1980, VALI

submitted

Facility

Cost

("FCP's") to the DOH that specified the services pro-

vided by VALI for the period January 1, 1978 through June 30,
1979 and the fees for those services.

(Stipulation of Facts f 1;

Findings and Conclusions of Administrative Law Judge 1F 1, p. 3 ) .

1

A Stipulation of Facts was executed by the parties hereto in
connection with the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge.
A copy of said Stipulation (hereinafter cited as "Stip.") is
attached hereto as Exhibit "A. " Similarly, the findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ Findings") are attached hereto as Exhibit "B."
-5-

3.
been

Under normal circumstances state audits would have

completed,

conferences

and

hearings

would

have

been

arranged, and payment made to VALI by July 1, 1980.

Memorandum
2
in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Petition, p. 3.
4.

Rather than beginning this process, however, the

state forwarded the FCP' s to the Bureau of Medicaid Fraud and, in
the Fall

of

1980, the Bureau

initiated

an investigation

lasted approximately two and a half years.

that

At the conclusion of

the investigation, in April, 1982, the Bureau stated that there
was no evidence to support any charges that VALI had filed false
or inaccurate FCP's.

VALI's claim for payment was reinstated.

(Stip. 1T 2; ALJ Findings H 1, p.3).
5.
Fraud,

During the investigation by the Bureau of Medicaid

virtually

every

business

seized by search warrant.

document

VALI

possessed

was

At the conclusion of the investiga-

tion, only part of VALI' s business records were returned, and
those that were returned were in such disarray as to be virtually
worthless

without

a

major

effort

at

reconstruction

by

VALI.

(Memorandum Decision, p. 2 ) .
6.
Bureau

issued

During
its

the

period

decision,

from

through

1

April,
March,

1982,
1985,

when
the

the
State

This fact was set forth in VALI's Memorandum opposing the
DOH's Motion to Dismiss its petition in the trial court without
record citation, but also without objection by the DOH.
-6-

conducted a series of informal hearings and conferences as part
of its cost audit process.

The issue of interest on the princi-

pal sum found to be due and owing by the DHCF was not addressed
at the conferences and informal hearings.

(Stip. H 12; ALJ Find-

ings irir 1, 3, pp. 4, 5 ) .
7.

The DOH issued a decision on March 18, 1985 after

an informal hearing, which stated, in part:
Both parties reserve the right to raise any
of the issues discussed in this hearing or
any related issues not necessarily discussed
at the informal hearing level if the conflict
cannot be resolved at the administrative
review level.
(Stip. 1f1f 11, 13 and Ex. H thereto).
8.

A supplemental decision, evidenced by a DOH letter

dated March 25, 1985, contained the same reservation of rights as
noted above.
9.

(Stip. f 14 and Exs. I and J thereto).
During the exit conferences and informal hearings,

VALI intentionally did not raise the issue of whether DOH should
pay interest on amounts found due and owing.

VALI intended to

raise the interest issue at a formal hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.
10.

(ALJ Findings ITf 1-3, pp. 3-5).

A determination was made that VALI was entitled to

the principal sum of $272,362.03, as a result of the informal
hearings and conferences.
11.

(Stip. 1T 17 and Ex. N thereto).

At approximately the same time, the State submit-

ted a proposed mutual release to VALI that would have released
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i:he State

from

any

claim

that

VALI might

(Stip. if 18 and Ex. N thereto).
release.

for

interest.

VALI refused to execute such a

(Transcript, pp. 7 5, 78).
12.

1985.

have

A meeting was held at the DHCF offices on May 13,

Participants included the DHCF acting director, an infor-

mal hearing officer, an audit manager, a State Assistant Attorney
General, the owner of VALI and counsel for VALI.

(Stip. 1f 20).

At that meeting, VALI informed the DHCF that the issue of interest had not been settled by the informal hearings.

All parties

agreed that the question of interest was never raised nor argued
as an identifiable issue during the informal hearings.

(Stip.

IT 21) .
13.
rant

On or about May 16, 1985, VALI cashed a state war-

in the amount of

$272,362.03.

(Stip. 11 24).

A

accompanying the warrant stated that the sum represented

letter
"full

settlement of all claims and demands arising from informal hearings conducted

. . .

on February 28, 1985 and March 20, 1985."

(Stip. 1T 23 and Ex. R thereto.)
14.

Subsequently, VALI

made

a timely

request

for a

formal hearing, at which the single issue would be whether VALI
was entitled

to

interest

on the

principal

sum paid.

(Stip.

f 25) .
15.

After evidence was received at the formal hearing,

the Administrative Law Judge found in favor of VALI and stated in
his written opinion:
-8-

There is nothing complex or mysterious about
it.
Respondent should pay the claimant
interest and ought to do so without further
delays.
(ALJ Findings, p. 7 ) .
16.

The

Executive

Director

of

the

Department

of

Health, without: having heard the evidence, overturned that decision and denied VALI any interest on the sum of money previously
paid.

DOH "Final Determination," dated April 18, 1986.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Under the common law of the State of Utah, a creditor

is entitled to interest "on debts overdue."

Utah Code Annotated

§

applicable

15-1-1 establishes

the

"forebearance of money."

rate of

interest

for the

Nothing in either the statute or the

common law would limit recovery of such interest only to situations in which the principal amount has been awarded pursuant to
a formal judgment.

In fact, such a limitation would be contrary

to the well established principle that "settlements are favored
in the law."

Since DOH retained money that was owed to VALI, it

must pay interest on the amount so retained, despite the fact
that the principal was paid in settlement.

In any event, VALI is

entitled to interest under the Utah Prompt Payment Act, which
requires

state agencies

to pay obligations

owing on contracts

within 60 days of their receipt of an invoice.

DOH claims that

the Prompt Payment Act is inapplicable to this case because the
delay resulted

from a "dispute."
-9-

In fact, as the ALJ

found,

there

vas

no

real

dispute

required to pay interest.

in

this

case,

and

DOH

should

be

Moreover, interpretation of the Prompt

Payment Act dispute provision

in the manner

suggested

by

DOH

would effectively nullify the entire Act, since state agencies
could avoid the Act's effect in every instance by simply disputing legitimate claimed charges.
ARGUMENT
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-1 AND THE COMMON
LAW OF UTAH, VALI IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER
INTEREST ON AMOUNTS PAST DUE.
VALI's claim of entitlement to interest on the principal sum paid by DOH in this case is founded on both statute and
Utah common law.

In Utah, the statutory rate of interest, as of

the dates of the parties' contracts, was as follows:
The legal rate of interest for the loan
or forbearance of any money, goods or things
in action shall be six per cent per annum.
But nothing herein contained shall be so
construed as to in any way affect any penalty
or interest charge, which by law applies to
delinquent or other taxes or to any contract
or obligations made before the 14th day of
May, 1907.
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Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (1953).

This provision establishes the

legal rate of interest applicable to payments required by contracts that do not themselves specify an applicable rate.

In

reliance upon § 15-1-1, the Utah Supreme Court has held that, "In
contract cases, certainly, interest on amounts found to be due in
judicial proceedings is recovery to which the creditor is entitled as a matter of law."
(Utah 1979).

Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d

800, 809

See also, SCM Land Company v. Watkins & Faber, 732

P.2d 105 (Utah 1986) .
Thus, VALI has a statutory right to recover interest on
the principal

sums paid to

parties' contracts.

it by DOH under the terms of the

Even in the absence of a statute, however,

purely equitable principles would mandate the same result.

For

example, in Holmes v. Kewanee Oil Company, 233 Kan. 544, 664 P.2d
1335, 1343 (1983), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 953 (1985), the Supreme
Court of Kansas stated that, "Where a party retains and makes
actual use of money

belonging

to

another,

however,

equitable

principles require it to pay interest on the monies so retained
and used."

The Supreme Court of Utah in Jack B. Parson Construc-

tion Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 107 (Utah 1976), while not specifying
the basis for its decision in that case, awarded interest against

J

The rate of interest provided by Section 15-1-1 was changed
by the legislature to 8 percent in 1981, and to 10 percent in
1985.
VALI contends that the interest to which it is entitled
during the relevant time periods should be measured at the legal
rates then in effect.
-11-

the State of Utah on a contractual obligation, and is consistent
with both the statute and the equitable principle described in
Holmes.
In any event, it has long been the case, under Utah
common law, that interest is allowable

n

on

debts overdue."

In

1890, well before § 15-1-1 had been enacted, the Utah Supreme
Court stated as follows:
At common law, no interest was allowed on
debts overdue, unless there was an express or
implied contract to pay interest.
•

*

*

This rule of the common law does not obtain
in America, and interest is allowed on debts
overdue even if there is no statute providing
for interest.
And the question has been
settled in this territory in favor of the
allowance of interest on debts overdue.
Wasatch Mineral Company v. Crescent Mineral Company, 24 P. 586,
587 (Utah 1890) (citations omitted).
There

remains

for

discussion,

however,

the

lower

court's concern that "pre-judgment interest" may not be available
where the parties have resolved the payment of principal without
entry of a judgment.
references

to

This concern was based, in large part, upon

"pre-judgment

interest"

contained

in

Jack

B.

Parson, supra, and indeed, in many other interest cases as well.
Such references are misleading to the extent that they imply that
interest on obligations is only available where a judgment has
been

rendered.

They are simply terms of convenience, used to

-12-

refer to the time period during which the interest runs—from the
aate payment is due to the date of judgment.

At that point, the

principal and interest is either paid, thereby ending the interest obligation, or the interest is added to the principal to form
the total judgment amount, to which the judgment rate of interest
is then applicable.
A more accurate term would perhaps be "prepayment" or
"pre-resolution" interest, since it is only the act of payment of
principal which is significant, as the payment of principal stops
the running of interest at the "legal rate."

The only signifi-

cance of entry of a judgment is that the party to be paid obtains
the

additional

benefit

of

effect, compound interest.

"judgment

interest,"

which

is,

in

However, nothing in § 15-1-1 in any

way limits its applicability to situations in which a judgment
for principal

is entered, nor do the cases applying equitable

principles in any way suggest that entitlement
dependent upon the entry of a judgment.
interest

to

interest

is

In fact, only judgment

(Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4) is expressly made dependent

upon the existence of a judgment.

The absence of such a limita-

tion in § 15-1-1 creates an inference that none exists.

4

Section 15-1-4 specifically provides for interest to be paid
on "judgments," which interest runs from the date of judgment
until the obligation has been paid. In contrast, § 15-1-1/ upon
Footnote continued on next page.
-13-

Logic

alone

would

also

dictate

that

petitioner's

entitlement to interest in this case should not d€?pend upon the
existence or nonexistence of a judgment for principal.

Interest

is payable for the forbearance of money, which exists whenever
the principal

obligation

is not

timely paid, whether

it is

ultimately reduced to judgment or is paid pursuant to a settlement by mutual agreement.

The only issue is the time at which

the running of interest ceases.

Where the principal is paid

prior to entry of a judgment, such as by virtue of a settlement,
the

fornearance

payable

is

is

necessarily

consequently

less.

shortened,
However,

and
the

the

interest

entitlement

to

interest does not change.
In the relatively few cases that have considered claims
for interest subsequent to payment of principal, the issue has
invariably been whether the party seeking payment waived its
entitlement to interest by acceptance of principal, rather than
wnether entitlement to interest is dependent upon the entry of a
judgment.

One such case, United States v. Consolidated Edison

Company of New York, Inc., 590 F.Supp.

266

(S.D.N.Y. 1984),

Footnote continued from previous page.
which petitioner relies, makes no reference whatsoever to the
existence of a judgment, and the interest provided therein runs
from the date on which the obligation of payment was due, until
either payment is made, at which point the interest obligation
ceases, or judgment is entered, at which point, § 15-1-4 becomes
applicable.
-14-

contains a discussion of this issue which is equally applicable
to the facts of the present case.
States

Postal

Service

("USPS"),

In that case, the United

had been

overcharged

for

its

electricity by Con Ed for a period of approximately five years.
After the error was discovered, Con Ed tendered USPS a check in
the amount of the overcharge, but refused its demand for interest
on that amount.

USPS negotiated the check, with an endorsement

that read, "Negotiation of this check is not to be construed as a
waiver of U.S. Postal Service's claim for interest payments," and
additionally, sent Con Ed a letter notifying it that the payment
had been accepted under protest.
USPS subsequently instituted a lawsuit for recovery of
interest on the overpayment, at the legal rate as provided by
statute.

In finding that the acceptance by USPS of principal did

not preclude it from seeking interest in a subsequent lawsuit,
the Court relied upon Girard Trust Company v. United States, 270
U.S. 163, 168 (1926), which contains the following language:
In this case, there is statutory provision
for it [interest], and it is analogous to a
suit in debt or covenant in which the contract specifically provides for payment of
interest on the principal debt.
In such
cases, the authorities all hold that the
acceptance of the payment of the principal
debt does not preclude a further suit for the
interest unpaid.
And the same rule obtains
where the obligation is one that by statute
bears interest.
The Con Ed court additionally noted that USPS would have been
entitled to interest if it had sued for the principal amount,
-15-

since New York provides by statute for the recovery of interest
"upon a sum awarded because of a breach of performance of contract."
added).

N.Y.Civ.Prac.Law

§

5001

(McKinney

1963)

(emphasis

Under these circumstances, the court neld that USPS was

entitled to recover interest on

the principal sum, although it

had been paid voluntarily, stating:
Indeed, common sense dictates that result.
Con Ed, the party at fault for the error in
billing, should not be allowed to avoid the
plaintiff's claim for accrued interest, which
the plaintiff specifically reserved by both
its endorsement of the check and its letter
acknowledging
receipt
of
the check, by
putting plaintiff to the Hobson's choice of
accepting the refund without interest, or
waiting months, or more likely years, to
recover the principal plus interest in a
lawsuit.
In this case, the litigants are
giants—the United States Postal Service and
a large public utility.
In another case,
however, it may be an average consumer of
modest means, who under tne defendant's
theory could be forced to forego the right to
interest in order to receive a prompt refund
of an overcharge admittedly due him or her.
590 F.Supp. at 270 (emphasis added).
Common sense compels
case.

the same result

in the present

DOH should not be allowed to avoid paying

interest to

which VALI is legitimately entitled, by the mere fact that the
parties ultimately agreed to the payment of principal (some seven
years after petitioner had rendered the services upon which its
claims were based), rather than refusing to agree and taking the
entirety of the issues to final judgment.

It is well settled in

the

generally

State

of

Utah

that,

'The
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law

encourages

settlements," Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Utah 1984), and that, "The law has no
interest in compelling all disputes to be resolved by litigation. "

Utah

Department

of Administrative

Services

v.

Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 613 (Utah 1983).

Public

The reason

that, "Settlements are favored in the law, and should be encouraged, [is] because of the obvious benefits accruing not only to
the parties, but also to the judicial system.

Tracy-Collins Bank

& Trust Company v. Travelstead, 529 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979).
The lower court's ruling denying VALI interest in this case, on
the ground that it settled the issue of principal with DOH rather
than

taking

the

entire

matter

through

litigation

to

a

final

judgment, flies in the face of this well settled precedent, and
unfairly

denies

VALI

the

interest

to

which

it

is

legally

entitled.
II.

THE UTAH PROMPT PAYMENT ACT (UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 15-6-1, et sec[.) IS APPLICABLE TO VALI' S
CLAIM AGAINST THE DOH.
The

applies

to

Utah

all

Prompt

state

Payment

agencies

and

Act

(§§

requires

15-6-1,
them

to

et

seq. )

pay

for

services rendered pursuant to contracts within 60 days following
their receipt of an invoice.

Utah Code Ann. § 15-6-2.

The Act

further provides for payment of interest on amounts overdue, as
follows:
(1)
charged

Interest
shall
on
payments
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accrue
and
be
overdue
under

Section 15-6-2 at the rate of 15.5% per annum
beginning on the day after payment is due, if
the payment due date is specified by contract, or on the 61st day after receipt of
the invoice, if no payment date is specified
by contract.
Interest ceases to accrue* on
the date payment is made.
(2) Any interest which remains unpaid
at the end of any 6 0-day period or which
remains unpaid at the end of any specified
period provided by contract shall be added to
the principal amount of the debt and shall
thereafter accumulate interest.
Under

§

15-6-3, DHCF

obligations.

is required

to pay

interest

on

overdue

Here DHCF contends it has no interest obligation

under the Act because, under § 15-6-4, if the agency's failure to
timely pay

interest

is the result of a

"dispute" between

the

agency and the business over the amount due, the interest provision is not applicable.
dispute provision.

The State misplaces its reliance on the

Here the amount constituting the principal

sum resulted, not from a dispute between the parties, but from
the

State

audit

process

which

always

occurs

under

the

State

Medicaid program.
The DOH's only evidence on this issue was the simple
assertion by it that it "contested" VALI f s claim.
DOH

was

responsible

for

an

investigation

Indeed, the

that was

terminated

without any finding of bad conduct on VALI's part, but which did
seriously hamper VALI's efforts to provide detailed evidence of
its claims, as it was required to do by its contract.

What the

DOH did was to take advantage of the burden that it had caused to
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be placed on VALI in significantly delaying payment.

The only

tribunal in which the evidence has been heard found that there
was

no

legitimate

dispute,

and

that

ruling

should

be

given

effect.
Moreover, by the terms of the parties' own contract,
"all payments [are] subject to reasonable cost audit and adjustment."

This cost audit and adjustment procedure was precisely

the procedure in which the parties engaged and that resulted in
the ultimate "settlement" of VALI's claim.
this
§

procedure

15-6-3

drafted

has

by

automatically
been

DOH,

interpretation

is

constitutes

overridden

under

which

clearly

Under DOH's theory,

by

the

VALI's

a

terms
claim

unreasonable,

as

"dispute,"
of

the

contract,

arises.
has

and

Such

already

an

been

determined by the ALJ.
In this case, the

informal

hearings

and

conferences

were held to explain and document VALI's claim, not to provide a
forum for an adversarial dispute.
list prices or services —

The original contract did not

the understanding of the parties was

that VALI would submit its claims, noting prices and services, to
be followed by an audit.

Within a reasonable

time the State

would make payment to VALI.
Thus,

the

purpose

of

the

audit

process

is

not

to

resolve a dispute but to check fees and services as against the
cost reimbursement manual.

The State's position that VALI and

the State had a dispute is untenable.
-19-

An interpretation of the

Prompt

Payment

Act's

"dispute"

provision

such

as

the

State

suggests would mean that the State can take five to seven years
to "audit" a claim but not be responsible lor interest on the
amount ultimately found due.
Application of the Prompt Payment Act's dispute provision to bar interest on the principal paid to VALI in this case
would be unfair and contrary to a reasonable statutory interpretation.
zhe

VALI's claim for interest unquestionably falls within

Prompt Payment Act and the lower court's ruling granting

DOH's motion to dismiss should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
VALI is entitled to interest on the amounts unpaid by
the DOH under both the common and statutory law of the State of
Utah.

VALI was unjustifiably denied the use of money to which it

was entitled, for a period of several years, and both common law
and statutory principles require DOH to pay VALI for the use of
its money during that time.

Therefore, the lower court's judg-

ment denying VALI recovery of interest in this case should be
reversed.
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DATED this 29th day of December, 1988

/, n

jtf tAjinrvl-

SPENCER E. AUSTIN
JULIA/ C. ATTWOOD
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, four true and correct copies of the foregoing OPENING
3RIEF OF APPELLANT VALI CONVALESCENT AND CARE INSTITUTIONS to the
following on this 29th day of December, 1988:
Brian L. Farr
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

296:121288A
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EXHIBITS

Tab A

SPENCER E. AUSTIN (A0150)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING
* * * * * * *

VALI CONVALESCENT and
CARE INSTITUTIONS

STIPULATION OF FACTS

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE
FINANCING
Defendant.
* * * * * * *

The above-entitled matter is presently scheduled for
formal hearing before the Honorable David Stott, Administrative
Law Judge, on the 23rd day of July, 1985 at the hour of 9:00
a.m.

In an effort to simplify the formal hearing, the parties

hereby stipulate to the following facts:
1»

The

claimant

filed

Facility

Cost

Profiles

("FCP's") for the time period January 1, 1978 through June 30,
1978 and July 1, 1978 through June 30, 1979, with the Depart-

EXHIBIT A"

ment of Health, Division of Health Care Financing
funds expended
vices.

as a Medicaid provider

for

("DHCF") for

nursing

home

ser-

These FCP's's were filed in approximately January, 1980.
2.

FCP's's

The DHCF did not complete its adjustment of these

in 1980 due

to an investigation

ducted by the Bureau of Medicaid Fraud.

that was being con-

That investigation was

concluded on April 22, 1982 without the filing of any criminal
charges.

The decision not to file charges is attached hereto

as Exhibit A.
3.

Exit

conferences were

conducted

regarding

FCP's's by the Division of Health Care Financing.

these

The claimant

was not satisfied with the results of the exit conferences and
requested an informal hearing pursuant to the provisions of the
Administrative

Hearing

Procedures

for Medicaid

Recipients

and

Providers.
4.
wherein

An informal hearing was held on October 25, 1984,

a request was

made

of

the

DHCF

to

compute

a

total

figure relating to the audit in question.
5*
1984.

The DHCF sent a letter to claimant on December 7,

That letter is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
6.

ber 26, 1984.

The Claimant sent a letter to the DHCF on DecemThat letter is attached hereto as Exhibit C.

-2-

7.

The DHCF sent a letter to the claimant on Febru-

ary 15, 1985.
8.

That letter is attached hereto as Exhibit D.
The claimant sent a letter to the DHCF on Febru-

ary 15, 1985,
9.

That letter is attached hereto as Exhibit E.
The

ary 19, 1985.
10.

DHCF

sent

a

letter

to

claimant

on

Febru-

That letter is attached hereto as Exhibit F.
Spencer E. Austin, counsel

for claimant, sent a

letter to Suzanne Dandoy, M.D., Director of the Department of
Health*

That letter is attached hereto as Exhibit G.
11.

The

informal

hearing

was

held

on

February 28,

1985 before Steven Gatzmeier, a DHCF hearing officer.
12.
owing

by

The issue of interest on any sums found due and

the

DHCF

was

not

addressed

in

any

manner

in

the

informal hearing.
13.

The decision of the informal hearing officer was

issue on March 18, 1985 and is attached hereto as Exhibit H.
14.
hearing

TWo supplements

officer were

to the decision of the

issued

on March 25, 1985

informal

and March 27,

1985 and are attached hereto as Exhibits I and J.
15.
ing

officer

The claimant sent a letter to the informal heardated

March 22,

1985.

That

letter

is

attached

hereto as Exhibit K.
16.

The

April 1, 1985.

claimant

sent

a

letter

to

the

DHCF

That letter is attached hereto as Exhibit L.
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on

17.

The

April 3, 1985.
18.
hand

a

letter

to

the

claimant

On or about April 4, 1985, counsel

on

a proposed

Mutual

Release

for the DHCF

to counsel

for

the

That document is attached hereto as Exhibit N.
19.

ing

sent

That letter is attached hereto as Exhibit M.

delivered

claimant.

DHCF

The claimant sent a letter to the informal hear-

officer

dated

April 5,

1985.

That

letter

is

attached

hereto as Exhibit 0.
20.

There was

DHCF on May 13, 1985.
A.

Glen

a meeting

held

at

the

office

of

the

of

the

In attendance were the following:
Blonquist

-

Acting

Director

Division of Health Care Financing
B.

Steven Gatzmeier - Informcil Hearing Officer

C.

Dennis Pettey - Audit Manager

D.

Clark C. Graves - Assistant Attorney General

E.

Richard

A.

Brown

-

Owner

of

Vali

Convalescent and Care institutions

21.
above,

the

opinion,

F.

James B. Lee - Counsel for Claimant

G.

Spencer E. Austin - Counsel for Claimant

At the meeting made reference to in paragraph 20
DHCF. was

the

issue

informal hearing•

of

informed

by

interest

the

had

claimant

not

been

that,

in

his

settled

by

the

The claimant was informed by representatives
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of the DHCF that, in their opinion, the question of interest
was settled by the informal hearing.
All parties agreed that the question of interest
was never raised nor argued as an identifiable issue during the
informal hearing.
22.

On or about May 14, 1985, the document attached

hereto as Exhibit P was transmitted from counsel for the DHCF
to counsel for the claimant.
23.

The

Claimant

received

a check

for

the sum of

£274,223.17 on May 16, 1985 with an accompanying letter signed
by Steven Gatzmeier.

That check and the accompanying letter

are attached hereto as Exhibits Q and R.
24.

On or about May 16, 1985, the claimant cashed the

State Warrant attached hereto as Exhibit Q.
25.

A timely request for a Formal Hearing was made on

May 21, 1985 pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative
Hearing Procedures

for Medicaid Recipients and Providers and

was limited to the sole issue of whether interest is due and
owing on the sum paid to the Claimant.
DATED this^^r/day of L^j/o

, 1985.

^^^^A_^
CLARK C. GRAVES
Assistant Attorney
General

SPEj^fER E. AUSTIS
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Claimant
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IN THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING

JALI CONVALESCENT and CARE
INSTITUTIONS.

)
)
)
)

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

vs.

)

CASE NO.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH.
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE
FINANCING

)
)
)

Claimant.

Respondent.

)

The above-entitled matter came on for formal hearing the 23rd
day of July. 1985 at the hour of 9:00 A.M. before David L. Stott.
Administrative Law Judge
Spencer

Austin

designated

and

("ALJ'1). Claimant was represented

Respondent

responsibility

Respondent's

response

of

and.

by
the

Mr.
ALJ

Clark
to

hear

thereupon, to make

Graves.

It

Claimant's
findings

by Mr.
is the
claim.

of fact,

conclusions of law and recommendations for the consideration of the
Executive

Director

of

the

Department

of

Health, who

makes

the

ultimate disposition of the matter for the Department.
At the outset of the hearing. Claimant's counsel raised a
question about the fairness of the proceeding. He noted that the
Respondent and the decision-maker in this case are one and the same,
to wit: the Department of Health. The ALJ would only comment that
the

identity

of Respondent

and

ultimate

decision-maker

will not

affect the ALJ's independence and his determination of the merits of
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Laimant's

claim.

Furthermore.

the

ALJ

anticipates

that

the

Kecutive Director, being a non-lawyer ,~~ would rely heavily upon the
LJ ' s independent

findings

and

conclusions

in making

his

or her

ecision. Finally, the ALJ would note that Complainant has available
o

it

full

appeal

rights

through

the

judicial

system

following

•xhaustion of its administrative oportunities.
At

the

hearing,

a

briefing

schedule

was

established,

subsequently extended and briefs were ultimately submitted

by the

parties. A second brief was submitted by Respondent. Mr. Graves of
the Attorney

General's

Office

determined

to

submit

an

affidavit

setting forth facts related to the matter and. thereupon, withdrew
as counsel for Respondent and was replaced by Mr. William C. Quigley.
The sole issue presented

to the ALJ. as stipulated

by the

parties, is whether or not the Claimant, Vali Convalescent and Care
Institutions

("Vali"), has

settled

and compromised

its claim for

interest in connection with payments made by Respondent to Vali for
health care services.
Respondent

takes

the position

that the parties effected a

settlement of all issues including interest not later than April 5.
1985, and that in any event the interest issue was lost to Claimant
thereafter when Claimant cashed the State's warrant for the amount
of principal agreed upon, because claims of interest, regardless of
their merit, are lost once the principal amount has been settled and
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paid. Claimant, obviously, takes a different view of the matter.
Claimant

argues

conceded

the

reasonable

that

issue

of

interest

it

at

no

interest

time
and

concluded

the question nor

is still

fully

entitled

to

on the principal amount paid to it; the ALJ

agrees with Claimant.
The facts of the case were stipulated by the parties and are
adopted by the AL J • Said facts are contained in the Stipulation of
Facts, which is a part of this record and does not need restatement
here.

DISCUSSION. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Facility Cost Profiles ('TCP's") submitted by Claimant
to the Respondent in January, 1980 relate to services performed as
far back as January, 1978. Claimant received payment of principal
sums for his services in May. 1985 and. thus, waited more than seven
years for payment of some services. The delay came about in part
because of a two-year, three-month investigation of Claimant's FCP's
by

the

Bureau

of

Medicaid

Fraud--apparently

at

the

request

of

Respondent. The Bureau concluded ultimately that it could not make a
case

against

Claimant,

Thereafter.

Claimant

reconstruct documentation, which had been damaged

was

forced

to

or lost in the

aforesaid investigation, which delayed the matter further. Finally,
in 1984 an exit conference and an informal hearing took place to
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establish the amounts owed Claimant. Thereafter, however, there were
still

disputes

additional

about

informal

the

amounts

due

Claimant

and,

therefore,

hearing's were held. Although Claimant clearly-

stated its claim for interest prior to the informal hearings, it did
not

raise

the

claim

during

the

informal

hearings, determining,

apparently, to get resolved the matter of principal before pursuing
the interest claim. It wasn't until April 5, 1985, that Claimant
could and did accord by letter with Respondent's offer of principal
(subsequent payment of which included an amount of interest for the
period April 5, 1985 to date of payment by warrant).
2. I conclude that Claimant at no time considered that the
matter of interest had been settled or compromised. By his letter of
April

5, 1985, he agreed

to accept $272,362.03 as the principal

amount due him for health care services rendered. It was Claimant's
apparent

intent

to get from Respondent

the principal

amount for

which it had waited some seven years before taking up the matter of
interest, which

it

had

reason

to

believe

would

be disputed

by

Respondent. It appears that the Respondent attempted on at least one
occasion to draw from Claimant a concession of the interest issue in
Respondent's

favor

prior

to

payment

of

the

principal. However,

Claimant's response was at most ambiguous and a reflection of its
apprehension that any firm assertions regarding interest would have
further

delayed

payment

of

principal. Respondent

had

the use of

Claimant's money for seven years and every equity which appears here
would suggest that Respondent ought to pay Claimant compensation for
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the use of its money. It appears that Respondent has chosen to focus
solely on whether or not it can be compelled as a matter of law to
pay interest on Claimant's money and

ignore the demands of equity.

The reason for that attitude is, unfortunately, not clear from this
record.
3.

It

is

certainly

true

that

the

parties

arrived

at

a

settlement of the amount of principal to be paid Claimant on April
5,

1985;

Claimant

could

principal

having

raised

informal

hearings

and

not

all

now

claim

pertinent

having

additional

issues

accepted

amounts

of principal

the

proffered

of

at the

amount

of

principal by its letter of April 5, 1985. Respondent is entitled to
rely

on

different

the

settlement

matter.

The

of

issue

principal.
of

Interest,

interest

was

not

however,
raised

is
at

a
the

informal hearings because Claimant apparently intended to deal with
the issues of principal and interest separately and in order. Having
resolved

the

issue

position—rejected
because
Claimant

the
met

principal,

it

then—consistent

the release document prepared

release
with

of

included

Respondent

a
and

waiver

of

manifest

with

its

by the Respondent,

interest.'
plainly

that

Thereafter,
it wanted

interest on the principal. Its meeting with Respondent was prior to
the delivery of the warrant for the amount of principal. Respondent
did not restrict endorsement on the warrant but allowed Claimant to
cash

the warrant

on May

16, 1985 knowing

full well that Claimant

expected payment of interest on the principal sum.
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4. As previously stated, Respondent has apparently determined
:o ignore the equities in this case; however. I do not believe that
the

law

:ompany,

supports 'Respondent's
Inc. v.

State

Road

position

Commission.

either.
583

Cox

P.2d

Construction

85

(Utah

1978).

sited by Respondent as authority for the proposition that Claimant's
interest claim cannot now be allowed, is distinguishable
case.

In

interest

Cox

the

Court

recites

the

general

principal

from this
that

where

is payable merely as damages for nonpayment of money when

due. acceptance of the principal amount bars any claim for interest,
save, of course, where claimant has clearly preserved the issue of
interest.

In

Cox

the

stipulations

completely silent on the subject

of

between

the

parties

were

interest such that it appeared

that the claimant in that case had decided to ask for interest as an
afterthought. In this case the Respondent knew or should have known
that Claimant was not stipulating to the release of interest claims.
In this case Claimant made express claim for the interest prior to
taking and cashing the warrant and made it plainly known that it was
preserving the issue of interest for further determination.
5. Beyond that, however, the Utah Procurement Code. Utah Code
Ann. Section

63-56-1. fet seq.. effective

July

1. 1980. appears to

establish Claimant's claim:
Interest on amounts ultimately determined to
be due to a contractor or the state shall be
payable at the rate applicable to judgments
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from the date the claim arose through the
date of decision or judgment, whichever is
later (emphasis added).

?his

particular

:annot

statutory

apparently

be

passage—the

based

on

case

interpretation

law—appears

to

of

which

establish

in

Tlaimant an entitlement to interest on his claim for principal from
:he time the claim arose through the date of decision.
Here
Dwed

a

the Claimant

substantial

sum

was
of

a contractor
money

for

with

seven

the

years,

state. He was
the

delay

in

payment being caused primarily by the actions of the state. Interest
could not be applied until the amount of principal was established.
Once the state had finally satisfied itself concerning the amount of
principal owed
statute

to Claimant. Claimant was entitled

indicates

that

the

rate

of

interest

to interest. The

to be applied

to the

principal amount is that which is applicable to judgments. There is
nothing

complex

or mysterious

about

it. Respondent

should

Claimant interest and ought to do so without further delays.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW* JUDGE

rJ^VC^sC'f
<^iDAVID
L. STOTT

pay the

